

MEMORANDUM

TO: HE/50/G/2      □  
FROM: HE/50/G/E      □  
SUBJECT: Country Plan—Staybehind Aspects  
REFERENCE: TS-73135

26 MARCH 1952

1. Definition. The West German staybehind program, composed of PASTIME (BOB) and KIBITZ (FOB) includes a series of projects designed to provide us with intelligence assets and resources in Berlin, the Soviet Zone and West Germany either when our bases must be evacuated under threat of war or when hostilities actually break out and contact with our present sources is no longer possible. The program consists of the recruitment, training and equipping of agents in areas thought to be important during a war-time situation. These agents will not serve in any capacity other than staybehind activities and will not be activated until shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. The program is short-range in nature; consequently, we have ruled out nets which will remain undercover for an extended period of time; i.e., six to twelve months after war has begun.

2. Type of Operation. The sole activity of staybehind agents will be the gathering and transmitting of information on OB, for the most part, and miscellaneous operational data through observer-type operations. The principal means of communication will be by radio to a base station which has yet to be established.

3. Types of Nets. All nets will be of the short-range variety. They will be activated shortly after war breaks out and will be directed from the Commo base thereafter. The nets cannot be considered as emergency nets since we do not intend to sacrifice security for immediate gains, but will instead strive to keep all nets in operation for the longest period possible. There will be no early-warning nets since no on-the-air work will be accomplished until after the outbreak of hostilities.

4. Extent of Staybehind Program.

a. Number of Nets. BOB plans to establish 23 nets in all, with 10 nets planned to cover 6 Priority A targets; 6 nets to cover 6 Priority B targets; and 7 nets to cover 7 Priority C targets. FOB plans are somewhat less definite and will depend on the time available; At present it is planned to establish approximately 5 or 6 nets from among the agents recruited directly by U. S. case officers, and 12 to 14 nets from among agents recruited by the complex of KIBITZ 15, an agent who works more or less independently.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐  
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒  
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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b. Location of Nets. BOB plans to establish 4 nets in the Berlin area and 19 in the Soviet Zone. FOB nets are located for the most part in the U. S. Zone of West Germany, with a heavy concentration of nets in the Stuttgart-Karlsruhe area.

c. Size of Teams. The BOB staybehind teams are to be composed of 5 members, including a head agent, W/T operator, a live letter drop, and two cut-outs. The FOB teams vary in size from two to six or eight members; they employ somewhat the same system as BOB in the make-up of the individual teams.

d. Recruitment of Agents. BOB has recruited approximately 8 agents as W/T operators; none of these agents has yet been incorporated into any stay-behind team, so that no units have been established thus far. FOB case officers have recruited approximately 23 staybehind agents for five to six units; one of these units is now ready for equipment and signal plans. The KIRITZ 15 complex has recruited roughly 90 agents for 12 to 14 proposed units; 2 of these units are now ready for activation.

Both components of the KIRITZ program will continue under development and refinement until the withdrawal of U. S. forces from Germany, whereupon it will become an intelligence collection activity.

5. Targets. In the case of BOB (PASTIME) the IPC list of immediate targets (TS-72722) was first employed as a rough basis for a target list, which was then amended by taking the ZIPPER targets into consideration. The resulting tentative target list was then forwarded to DOD as MCQW-13169. The supposition is that this latter list will be submitted to the IPC after review by BOB. In the case of FOB (KIRITZ) it is suggested that a tentative target list be developed on the basis of the ZIPPER target complex; it should then be submitted to the IPC for final review. (Thus far no target list exists for the KIRITZ program.)

6. Burials and Caches. BOB has accomplished the burial or caching of 11 radio sets plus equipment; however, five of these sets are presumed scratched for security or other reasons. The remaining 9 sets are still buried or cached and will be replaced in the spring of 1952 with the RS-1. In addition, BOB plans to bury or cache enough radio sets and equipment to service the 23 nets planned. FOB has buried or cached 13 radio sets and equipment, of which 4 sets have been exhumed and discovered to be unuseable. The remaining 9 sets will be replaced during the spring of 1952 with the RS-1 and additional sets will be buried, cached, or turned over to W/T agents who have been cleared.

7. Activation of Nets. Activation of the nets will be at U. S. direction only and will not be left in the hands of the agent as in the case of the ZIPPER staybehind effort. The W/T operator is to remain off the air until he receives the base signal directing him to open contact. All nets will be activated within as short a time as possible after the outbreak of hostilities; at the same time we must prepare for the eventuality that Commo may take months to get a base station in operation.

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8. Activation Time Table. The following represents an arbitrary schedule for activation of the agent:

a. For three weeks the agent will lie dormant and take steps either to preserve his cover or to change to a new identity, depending upon plans which have been made previously.

b. Between the fourth and sixth week the agent will listen to BBC German language broadcasts between certain hours on certain days for a "crack phrase" which will indicate to him that he should either (1) come on the air according to his signal plan, or (2) listen again to the BBC at a certain later date for an activation signal.

c. If the agent has not received his message, then during the 7th, 8th, and 9th weeks he will unearth his W/T set and listen to the asterisked scheduled broadcasts on his frequency according to his signal plan. These broadcasts will give him activation instructions. (The agent will have one set in his possession prior to hostilities; one set will be cached or buried as an auxiliary set.)

d. If the agent has received no word according to the above schedule, he will then follow these further instructions:

1. Listen for the next 12-month period to German language broadcasts emanating from Western Allied sources for his "crack phrase" which will give him further instructions.

2. For the first two weeks in four previously specified months at three-month intervals, beginning with the first month after the initial nine-week period, the agent will listen for "Horse-casts" on his frequency at certain times each day.

3. As a further precaution the agent will be given a dead letter drop which he will visit on a certain day each month during the above-mentioned 12-month period. If he receives a message from this source, he will answer by leaving a message on a certain day explaining his failure to make contact.

9. Phasing of the Staybehind Program.

a. BOB PASTIME. It is estimated that the establishment of 4 nets in the Berlin area and an additional 6 nets in the Soviet Zone will require from 24 to 36 months under the most favorable circumstances. For the establishment of the remaining 6 nets for Priority B targets and the 7 nets for Priority C targets an additional 24 to 36 months will be required.

b. FOB KIRITZ. Three nets are now ready for activation. It is estimated that successive periods of 12 months will be required for the establishment of groups of 6 staybehind units. Employing an arbitrary figure of three

*This should be used as alternate to radio contact during initial activation phase.*

*Too long will be "critical".*

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years before hostilities break out, there would then be 21 staybehind teams or nets available by the crucial date. Conversely, if war broke out one year hence, there would be only 9 units available.

10. Problems. There are several problems remaining to be solved, as follows:

a. The low priority assigned the West German staybehind program has resulted in very slow progress and a lack of sufficient case officers; this low priority is not justified in the opinion of the writer.

b. Inability to obtain a basic list of targets from the military.

c. Slowness of Commo support.

*I agree with "a."*

*I think we can get action on "b" if we try again.*

*I understand "c" is being remedied.*

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